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Abstract
The International Criminal Court relies on its State Parties to incor-
porate, or implement, its constituent instrument, the Rome Statute,
into their domestic legal systems to enable its effective functioning.
First, State Parties are obliged to give effect to their explicit obligation
to cooperate with the Court under the Rome Statute. Second, al-
though not required to do so, to avoid their national legal systems be-
ing found by the Court to be unable to investigate and/or prosecute
the crimes under its jurisdiction in accordance with the principle of
complementarity, they should also implement the deﬁnition and
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prohibition of these offences in their national legal frameworks. This
article appraises the status of the domestic implementation of the
Rome Statute, both crimes and cooperation, in Asia. The article con-
cludes that few Asian State Parties to the Rome Statute have incorpo-
rated the treaty’s provisions into their domestic laws in a holistic man-
ner, with the absence of cooperation legislation, enabling State Parties
to assist the Court, particularly striking.
I. Introduction
1. For the International Criminal Court (ICC, Court) to be able to function
effectively, its State Parties need to incorporate its constituent instrument, the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute, ICC
Statute),1 into their respective domestic legal orders—a process known as im-
plementation. The implementation process serves two purposes. First, enact-
ing national implementing legislation empowers State Parties to fulﬁl their
obligation under the ICC Statute to “ensure that there are procedures avail-
able under their national law for all of the forms of cooperation” speciﬁed in
Part IX thereof,2 and, further, their general obligation to “cooperate fully with
the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes” within its jurisdic-
tion.3 The late Professor and Judge Antonio Cassese notably described the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) as “a giant
without arms and legs [which] needs artiﬁcial limbs to walk and work. And
these artiﬁcial limbs are state authorities”.4 This memorable analogy is
equally, if not more, applicable to the ICC, which, like the ICTY, depends on
State authorities to enable its effective functioning. For example, the ICC
does not have a dedicated police force to identify and apprehend persons sus-
pected of committing international crimes or to gather evidence. In addition,
unlike the ICTY, the ICC is a court of last resort. In other words, by virtue of
complementarity, the principle that governs the Court’s relationship with na-
tional courts, the jurisdiction of the ICC is only triggered if the national
courts of the relevant State are unwilling or unable to investigate or
1 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute), 2187 UNTS
90.
2 Ibid., art. 88.
3 Ibid., art. 86.
4 Antonio Cassese, On the Current Trends Towards Criminal Prosecution and
Punishment of Breaches of International Humanitarian Law, 9 EJIL (1998), 2, 13.
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prosecute.5 Implementing the substantive law provisions of the Rome Statute
consequently permits State Parties to exercise primary jurisdiction over ICC
crimes, thereby fulﬁlling the principle of complementarity. In sum, therefore,
for States to be able to adequately perform their dual role envisaged by the
Rome Statute, they need to enact legislation implementing the Rome Statute,
as regards both crimes and cooperation, in their national legal orders. Of the
123 State Parties to the ICC Statute at the time of writing,6 approximately
40% have yet to enact national implementing legislation. This absence is par-
ticularly marked in Asia.
2. The United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court concluded with the adop-
tion of the Rome Statute on 17 July 1998. Twenty years later, this article
appraises the status of its domestic implementation in Asia. In so doing, the
article emphasizes the need for States to guarantee that their implementing
legislation not only incorporates the crimes listed in the ICC Statute into their
national legal orders, giving effect to the principle of complementarity, but
that it also enables the relevant State to “cooperate fully” with the Court. The
article highlights the absence of “cooperation legislation” among Asian State
Parties to the Rome Statute and concludes with a proposal to Asian State
Parties to the ICC Statute to ensure that their respective legal frameworks al-
low them not only to investigate and prosecute international crimes them-
selves, but would also enable the Court to do so on their respective territories,
should such a need arise. In order to be able to guarantee the latter, Asian
ICC State Parties need, ﬁrst and foremost, to give full effect to their obliga-
tions under the Rome Statute as regards cooperation with the Court.
3. The article is divided into three parts. First, after deﬁning “Asia” for the
purposes of the study, the article scrutinizes the lack of engagement by Asian
States with the Rome Statute system since its adoption. Second, the article
evaluates the extent to which Asian ICC State Parties have incorporated (ele-
ments of) the Rome Statute, both pertaining to the four crimes listed therein
and cooperation, into their respective domestic legal orders. Third, the article
concludes with some concrete recommendations for Asian State Parties to the
ICC Statute. The article draws upon existing literature examining domestic
5 Rome Statute, above n.1, art. 17.
6 For an up-to-date list of State Parties to the Rome Statute, see ICC, The States
Parties to the Rome Statute (https://asp.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states
%20parties).
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implementation of the Rome Statute in certain Asian ICC State Parties,
namely Bangladesh,7 Cambodia,8 Japan,9 and the Republic of Korea,10 which
have already received academic scrutiny. At the same time, the article intends
to shed light upon the Rome Statute implementation process in other national
jurisdictions subjected to a paucity of scholarly attention, whether because of
their failure to implement the Rome Statute or for other reasons. Rather than
examining the process in one particular Asian State, the article conducts an
appraisal of national legislation implementing the Rome Statute across Asia as
a whole.11 Further, throughout the article, the focus rests on State Parties to
the ICC Statute,12 i.e. those States under an obligation to cooperate with the
ICC and to ensure that their respective national legal frameworks enable them
7 Suzannah Linton, Completing the Circle: Accountability for the Crimes of the
1971 Bangladesh War of Liberation, 21 Criminal Law Forum (2010), 191.
8 Simon M. Meisenberg, Complying with Complementarity? The Cambodian
Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 5 Asian
JIL (2015), 123.
9 Shuichi Furuya, Domestic Implementation of the Rome Statute in Japan, 22 Seoul
ILJ (2015), 39; Jens Meierhenrich and Keiko Ko, How Do States Join the
International Criminal Court? The Implementation of the Rome Statute in Japan, 7
JICJ (2009), 233.
10 LEE Keun-Gwan, Domestic Implementation of the ICC Statute in Korea: A
Critical Analysis, 22 Seoul ILJ (2015), 57; Tae Hyun Choi and Sangkul Kim,
Nationalized International Criminal Law: Genocidal Intent, Command
Responsibility, and An Overview of the South Korean Implementing Legislation of
the ICC Statute, 19 Michigan State ILR (2011), 589; Young Sok Kim, The Korean
Implementing Legislation on the ICC Statute, 10 Chinese JIL (2011), 161. On the
implementation of the crime of aggression, see CHOI Tae-hyun, Ratiﬁcation and
Implementation of the Amendments on the Crime of Aggression under the ICC
Statute in Korea, 22 Seoul ILJ (2015), 7.
11 Cf. Hugo Relva, The Implementation of the Rome Statute in Latin American
States, 16 Leiden JIL (2003), 331. To the best of the author’s knowledge, there are
no similar studies dedicated to the implementation of the Rome Statute in Asian
(-Paciﬁc) States at the time of writing.
12 The relationship between the ICC and certain Asian States not party to the Rome
Statute has been explored elsewhere. See, for example, in respect of India, Usha
Ramanathan, India and the ICC, 3 JICJ (2005), 627; in respect of Iran, Hirad
Abtahi, The Islamic Republic of Iran and the ICC, 3 JICJ (2005), 635; and in re-
spect of China, LU Jianping and WANG Zhixiang, China’s Attitude Towards the
ICC, 3 JICJ (2005), 608; Bing Bing Jia, China and the International Criminal
Court: The Current Situation, 10 Singapore YBIL (2006), 87; Dan Zhu, China,
the International Criminal Court, and International Adjudication, 61 Netherlands
ILR (2014), 43. And in relation to the crime of aggression, see ZHU Dan, China,
the Crime of Aggression and the International Criminal Court, 5 Asian JIL (2015),
94. For a recent study comparing the positions taken by India and China, see
Chinese JIL (2019)
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to do so. This is not to say that States not party to the ICC Statute will not en-
act legislation allowing their own courts to try those suspected of committing
international crimes13 or even to cooperate with the ICC. Rather, the focus of
the present article is on those obliged to do the latter.
II. Asian Engagement with the Rome Statute System
4. The Asia-Paciﬁc region is the most underrepresented group among State
Parties to the ICC Statute. Following the accession of Palestine to the Rome
Statute in January 2015, there are 19 ICC State Parties in the Asia-Paciﬁc re-
gion, from a total of 53 States in the Asia-Paciﬁc regional group.14 Further,
on 17 March 2018, the Government of the Philippines notiﬁed the UN
Secretary-General of its decision to withdraw from the Rome Statute which,
pursuant to the procedure detailed in Article 127(1) thereof, “shall take effect
one year after the date of receipt of the notiﬁcation, unless the notiﬁcation
speciﬁes a later date”.15 As the notiﬁcation from the Philippines speciﬁed no
later date—on the contrary, it speciﬁed that “[t]he action shall take effect for
the Philippines on 17 March 2019”—its withdrawal from Rome Statute will
be effective on that date, unless a decision to the contrary is taken in the in-
terim.16 This will leave the Asia-Paciﬁc regional group with 18 State Parties to
the ICC Statute.
5. When one divides the Asia-Paciﬁc group into Asia and the Paciﬁc region
(or Oceania), respectively, the underrepresentation of Asian States becomes
even more evident.17 The UN Statistics Division has adopted a list of
Suzannah Linton, India and China Before, At, and After Rome, 16 JICJ (2018),
265.
13 On which, see the analysis in respect of the Criminal Code of the Republic of
Kazakhstan, a State not party to the Rome Statute, in Sergey Sayapin, The General
Principles of International Criminal Law in the Criminal Code of the Republic of
Kazakhstan, 9 Asian JIL (2018), 1.
14 See UN, United Nations Regional Groups of Member States (www.un.org/depts/
DGACM/RegionalGroups). It is noted that neither Palestine nor the Cook Islands
form part of the UN regional group, despite both being State Parties to the Rome
Statute.
15 Rome Statute, above n.1, art. 127(1).
16 Government of the Republic of the Philippines, Reference: C.N.138.2018.
TREATIES-XVIII.10 (Depositary Notiﬁcation) (treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/
CN/2018/CN.138.2018-Eng.pdf).
17 On the underrepresentation of and under-participation by Asian States in interna-
tional institutions, and some reasons behind this state of affairs, see Simon
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geographic regions, which are based on continental regions.18 According to
this system, Asia can be divided into ﬁve sub-regions:
(1) Central Asia, comprising ﬁve States;19
(2) Eastern Asia, comprising ﬁve States and two Special Administrative
Regions;20
(3) South-eastern Asia, comprising eleven States;21
(4) Southern Asia, comprising nine States;22 and
(5) Western Asia, comprising eighteen States.23
6. Chesterman recognizes the difﬁculties in deﬁning “Asia” partly as a result
of its diversity in his article on Asia’s ambivalence about international law and
institutions.24 In his words:
Indeed, the very concept of “Asia” derives from a term used in Ancient
Greece rather than any indigenous political or historic roots. Regional cohe-
sion is further complicated by the need to accommodate the great power
interests of China, India and Japan.25 [Footnote omitted.]
7. For the purposes of this article, a State is considered “Asian” if on the
geographical list used by the UN Statistics Division rather than among the
members of the Asia-Paciﬁc group. In other words, though Palestine appears
on the former list, but not the latter, it will be viewed as an “Asian” State.
Chesterman, Asia’s Ambivalence about International Law and Institutions: Past,
Present and Futures, 27 EJIL (2017), 945.
18 UN, Methodology: Standard Country or Area Codes for Statistical Use (M49),
(https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49). It is noted that the webpage
includes the following disclaimer: “The assignment of countries or areas to speciﬁc
groupings is for statistical convenience and does not imply any assumption regarding
political or other afﬁliation of countries or territories by the United Nations.”
19 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
20 China, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Japan, Mongolia, and Republic of
Korea. China, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and China, Macao
Special Administrative Region are listed separately.
21 Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic,
Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Viet Nam.
22 Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Maldives,
Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.
23 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Cyprus, Georgia, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait,
Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Palestine, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey,
United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.
24 Simon Chesterman, above n.17.
25 Ibid., 946.
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Conversely, because Fiji, Nauru, Marshall Islands, Samoa, and Vanuatu are
not identiﬁed as “Asian” according to the geographical list, they will not be
regarded as “Asian” States for the purposes of this study. Such divisions are,
though somewhat artiﬁcial, borne out of a desire to keep the subject-matter of
this article manageable. It is also argued that other categorizations are equally
artiﬁcial. As Chesterman observes, the UN Asia-Paciﬁc group of States “rarely
adopts common positions on issues and discusses only candidacies for interna-
tional posts. Such sub-regional groupings that exist within Asia have tended
to coalesce around narrowly shared national interests rather than a shared
identity or aspirations”.26 Geography therefore appears to be as suitable a cri-
terion as any according to which to deﬁne Asia.27
8. In terms of ratiﬁcation or accession, Asian participation in the Rome
Statute system can be depicted as follows when viewed using these ﬁve sub-
regions:
9. In other words, 13 of the 48 (or fewer than 30% of) Asian States have
ratiﬁed or acceded to the ICC Statute in the 20 years since it was concluded
in Rome. This ﬁgure renders Asia the least represented group of State
Parties to the Rome Statute.29 Turning to ratiﬁcation of the Kampala
Table 1.
Sub-region Parties
Central Asia 1 (Tajikistan)
Eastern Asia 3 (Japan, Mongolia, Republic of Korea)
South-eastern Asia 3 (Cambodia, The Philippines,28 Timor-Leste)
Southern Asia 3 (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Maldives)
Western Asia 3 (Cyprus, Jordan, Palestine)
26 Ibid., 946.
27 For the adoption of a geographical approach to deﬁning the Asia-Paciﬁc region in
the context of discussing engagement with the Rome Statute system, albeit with dif-
ferent results from the present application, see Steven Freeland, International
Criminal Justice in the Asia-Paciﬁc Region: The Role of the International Criminal
Court Treaty Regime, 11 JICJ (2013), 1029, 1031. Freeland’s geographical ap-
proach leads to the exclusion of Afghanistan, Cyprus, Jordan, Maldives, Mongolia,
and Tajikistan.
28 The Philippines’ withdrawal from the Rome Statute will take effect on 17 March
2019. See Government of the Republic of the Philippines, above n.16.
29 By way of comparison, there are 33 African ICC State Parties (out of 56 members
of the UN African Group of Member States), 18 Eastern European ICC State
Parties (out of 23 members of the UN Eastern European Group of Member States,
Birkett, Twenty Years of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
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amendments on the crime of aggression, Cyprus and Palestine are the only
Asian ICC State Parties to have ratiﬁed the amendments of the 35 States to
have done so in total.30 Further, of the 13 ICC State Parties in Asia, only
three: Cyprus, the Republic of Korea, and Palestine, have ratiﬁed the
Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International Criminal
Court (APIC), which was adopted by the Assembly of States Parties—the
Court’s management oversight and legislative body—in September 2002.31
Notwithstanding, Asian underrepresentation among the State Parties to the
Rome Statute and the failure to ratify, or delay in ratifying, the Kampala
amendments and the APIC does not mean that the 13 Asian ICC State
Parties ought to have neglected to incorporate aspects of the Rome Statute
regime into their respective domestic legal orders. It is to this national
implementing legislation (or, where applicable, the lack thereof) that the
present analysis now turns.
III. National Implementing Legislation in Asia
10. Asian States have not been immune from the (alleged) commission of
mass atrocities within their territories. Indeed, at the time of writing, the
ICC Ofﬁce of the Prosecutor is investigating or examining the alleged com-
mission of crimes under the Court’s jurisdiction in Afghanistan,32
Bangladesh/Myanmar,33 Georgia,34 Iraq/UK,35 Palestine,36 and the
28 Latin American and Caribbean ICC State Parties (out of 33 members of the UN
Latin American and Caribbean Group of Member States), and 25 Western
European and other ICC State Parties (out of 29 members of the UN Western
European and Others Group of Member States).
30 See UN, Amendments on the Crime of Aggression to the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, (treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src¼TRE
ATY&mtdsg_no¼XVIII-10-b&chapter¼18 ).
31 See UN, Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International Criminal
Court (treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src¼treaty&mtdsg_no¼xviii-13&
chapter¼18).
32 See ICC, Afghanistan (www.icc-cpi.int/afghanistan).
33 See ICC, Bangladesh/Myanmar (www.icc-cpi.int/rohingya-myanmar).
34 See ICC, Georgia (www.icc-cpi.int/georgia).
35 See ICC, Iraq/UK (www.icc-cpi.int/iraq).
36 See ICC, Palestine (www.icc-cpi.int/palestine).
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Philippines.37 This section scrutinizes the state of progress with respect to
enacting national implementing legislation across the 13 Asian State Parties to
the Rome Statute and considers how a more holistic implementation thereof
can help the ICC achieve its purposes. Before turning to whether, and, if so,
the extent to which, these States have incorporated the Rome Statute coopera-
tion regime into their respective national legal frameworks, the article ﬁrst
considers how States have implemented the deﬁnition and prohibition of the
four crimes over which the ICC can exercise jurisdiction, namely the crime of
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.
III.A. Implementing the Rome Statute Crimes
11. ICC State Parties are not under an explicit obligation to implement the
deﬁnition and prohibition of the offences listed therein. In other words, de-
spite the appeal of doing so, not least to fulﬁl the principle of
complementarity:
The decision to implement the crimes [sic] listed under Article 5 of the
ICC Statute—genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ag-
gression—remains at the discretion of the State. The same holds true
with regard to defences and modes of responsibility[.]38
12. This said, in order to avoid being found by the ICC to be unwilling or un-
able to investigate and/or prosecute crimes under its jurisdiction, certain States
have sought to incorporate the offences into their national legal frameworks.
The need to proscribe Rome Statute crimes at the domestic level is therefore
clear: in order for national investigations and prosecutions to be able to take
place, adequate legislation implementing the four crimes must be enacted.
III.A.i. The crime of genocide
13. A number of Asian States had already legislated to proscribe the crime of
genocide in their national legal frameworks before they ratiﬁed or acceded to
the Rome Statute. This can be explained by the fact that these States had al-
ready ratiﬁed or acceded to the Convention on the Prevention and
37 See ICC, The Philippines (www.icc-cpi.int/philippines).
38 Case Matrix Network, Implementing the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court (2017) (www.legal-tools.org/doc/e05157/).
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Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention)39 and had
subsequently decided to incorporate elements thereof into their respective na-
tional laws. Of the 13 Asian State Parties to the Rome Statute that form the
subject of the present article, 10 had ratiﬁed or acceded to the Genocide
Convention before joining the ICC Statute system. The following table is il-
lustrative in this respect, with the second column indicating the date of ratiﬁ-
cation (marked with “r”) or accession (marked with “a”) to the Genocide
Convention, and the third column showing the date of ratiﬁcation or acces-
sion to the Rome Statute:
14. Tajikistan thus constitutes an exception to the general rule, having ac-
ceded to the Genocide Convention after ratifying the ICC Statute. It is also
noteworthy that Japan and Timor-Leste have not yet acceded to the
Genocide Convention despite both having been State Parties to the ICC
Statute for a number of years. In the case of Timor-Leste, this situation could
result from it having gained independence on 20 May 2002, more than ﬁfty
years after the entry into force of the Genocide Convention. Regardless, nei-
ther Japan nor Timor-Leste could rely on having pre-existing national
Table 2.
State Party Genocide Convention40 Rome Statute41
Afghanistan 22 Mar 1956 a 10 Feb 2003 a
Bangladesh 5 Oct 1998 a 23 Mar 2010 r
Cambodia 14 Oct 1950 a 11 Apr 2002 r
Cyprus 29 Mar 1982 a 7 Mar 2002 r
Japan 17 Jul 2007 a
Jordan 3 Apr 1950 a 11 Apr 2002 r
Maldives 24 Apr 1984 a 21 Sep 2011 a
Mongolia 5 Jan 1967 a 11 Apr 2002 r
Palestine 2 Apr 2014 a 2 Jan 2015 a
The Philippines 7 Jul 1950 r 30 Aug 2011 r
Republic of Korea 14 Oct 1950 a 13 Nov 2002 r
Tajikistan 3 Nov 2015 a 5 May 2000 r
Timor-Leste 6 Sep 2002 a
39 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Genocide Convention), 78 UNTS 277.
40 See UN, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
(treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src¼IND&mtdsg_no¼IV-1&chapter¼4).
41 See UN, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (treaties.un.org/pages/
ViewDetails.aspx?src¼IND&mtdsg_no¼XVIII-10&chapter¼18).
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legislation criminalizing genocide at the time they acceded to the Rome
Statute from having already implemented (elements of) the Genocide
Convention.
15. Not all 13 Asian ICC State Parties explicitly criminalize genocide in
their national legal systems. Afghanistan, Japan, Jordan, Maldives, and
Palestine possess no speciﬁc legislation proscribing the crime. This absence
means that, should the courts in these State Parties wish to exercise jurisdic-
tion over conduct that could constitute genocide, they are only able do so by
acting pursuant to “ordinary” domestic criminal provisions. In discussing
Japan’s lack of dedicated legislation implementing the deﬁnition and prohibi-
tion of the crime of genocide in its national law, Meierhenrich and Ko express
the following concern regarding this approach:
prosecuting genocide as “multiple homicide”—the strategy favored by
the Government of Japan—is not commensurable with the purpose of
the Rome Statute precisely because it would in such an instance be un-
able to communicate the fact that aside from a (typically sizable) number
of individual victims, humanity is also under attack.42
16. Other Asian ICC State Parties criminalize genocide in their respective do-
mestic legal orders by incorporating the exact wording used in the Genocide
Convention and ICC Statute or by expressly referring thereto. For example,
Cypriot Law No. 59/1980, designed to implement the Genocide Convention
into the domestic law of the Republic of Cyprus, criminalizes the “acts de-
scribed in Article II of the [Genocide] Convention”.43 Additionally, when
amending its dedicated domestic legislation implementing the Rome Statute,
Cyprus deﬁned the crime of genocide as follows: “‘genocide’ means any of the
acts speciﬁed in article 6 of the Rome Statute.”44 Other Asian ICC State
Parties to adopt largely similar wording to the deﬁnitions enumerated in the
Genocide Convention and the ICC Statute in their national implementing
42 Jens Meierhenrich and Keiko Ko, above n.9, 248. Emphasis in original.
43 The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Law
of 1980 (1980), art. 4. On the incorporation of the crime of genocide into domestic
law by reference beyond Asia, see William A. Schabas, Genocide in International
Law: The Crime of Crimes (2009), 406.
44 The Rome Statute for the Establishment of the International Criminal Court
(Ratiﬁcation) (Amendment) Law of 2006 (2006) (Cyprus Rome Statute
Ratiﬁcation Law), s. 2. The 2006 Law amended The Rome Statute for the
Establishment of the International Criminal Court (Ratiﬁcation) Law of 2002.
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legislation are the Republic of Korea45 and Tajikistan.46 It is also noteworthy
that Jordan, in Article 11 of its draft national implementing legislation,
“reproduces verbatim the deﬁnition of the crime of genocide as stipulated in
article 6 of the . . . Rome Statute”.47
17. Olympia Bekou notes that, when implementing the deﬁnition and pro-
hibition of the crime of genocide into their national legal orders, when States
do not follow verbatim the deﬁnition in the Genocide Convention, they are
over- or under-inclusive in terms of the protected groups and the prohibited
acts.48 This trend, which Bekou identiﬁes based on a survey of States from
Africa, Europe, and the Americas,49 is also evident in several Asian State
Parties to the Rome Statute. For example, as for being over-inclusive in its na-
tional implementing legislation, Bangladesh extends the deﬁnition of the
groups protected by the Genocide Convention and Rome Statute (national,
ethnical, racial, and religious groups) to include a further group, namely polit-
ical groups.50 The Philippines’ national implementing legislation goes even
further, including, in addition to the four groups named in the Genocide
Convention and ICC Statute, “social or any other similar stable and perma-
nent group”.51 The inclusion of other stable and permanent groups reﬂects
the vocabulary used by the Trial Chamber of the International Criminal
45 Act on the Punishment of Crimes within the Jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court (2007) (Korean ICC Act), art. 8. See also Young Sok Kim, above
n.10, 167.
46 Criminal Code of the Republic of Tajikistan (1998), art. 398.
47 Ibrahim Aljazy, The Implementation of International Criminal Law in Arab States:
The Jordanian Experience, in: Lutz Oette (ed.), Criminal Law Reform and
Transitional Justice: Human Rights Perspectives for Sudan (2011), 183, 192.
48 Olympia Bekou, Crimes at Crossroads: Incorporating International Crimes at the
National Level, 10 JICJ (2002), 677, 680.
49 Ibid., 680-83. Bekou refers to Bolivia, Paraguay, Nicaragua, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Lithuania, Panama, Poland, Switzerland, Latvia, Estonia,
France, Burkina Faso, Mexico, Finland, and Spain (in addition to the United States,
a State not party to the Rome Statute, but which criminalizes genocide).
50 The International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973 (1973), s. 3(2)(c). The 1973 Act
was amended by The International Crimes (Tribunals) (Amendment) Act, 2013
(2013). On the inclusion of political groups in national laws criminalizing genocide
more widely, see William A. Schabas, above n.43, 406.
51 Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and
Other Crimes Against Humanity (2003) (Philippine IHL Act), s. 5(a). Otherwise,
the deﬁnition of genocide in the Philippines’ national implementing legislation
largely reﬂects the wording of the Genocide Convention and Rome Statute.
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Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu,52 which
has received criticism for its reading of the wording of the Genocide
Convention and the intention of its drafters.53 As Bekou observes:
Extending the protection to groups that are vulnerable in a given state
may be important for a particular jurisdiction, but it is equally important
to examine how this is applied in practice, as there is always the risk of
diluting the crime of genocide the prosecution of which is normally re-
served for the most serious atrocities.54
18. Turning to over-inclusiveness in terms of the prohibited acts, Timor-Leste
criminalizes several forms of genocidal conduct beyond those included in the
Genocide Convention and ICC Statute.55 The acts that could constitute
genocide, that is, if executed with the requisite speciﬁc intent,56 in Timor-
Leste’s national implementing legislation are as follows:
(a) Homicide or offence against the physical or mental integrity of mem-
bers of the group;
(b) By whatever means, acts that prevent members of the group from
procreating or giving birth;
(c) Rape, sexual enslavement, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy,
forced sterilization or any other form of sexual violence of comparable
seriousness;
(d) Separation of members of the group into another group by violent
means;
52 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul
Akayesu, Judgement, 2 September 1998, ICTR-96-4-T, para.516 (“the intention
of the drafters of the Genocide Convention . . . according to the travaux pre´para-
toires . . . was patently to ensure the protection of any stable and permanent
group.”)
53 For a contemporary example, see Nina H.B. Jørgensen, The Deﬁnition of
Genocide: Joining the Dots in the Light of Recent Practice, 1 International
Criminal LR (2001), 285, 288, describing the reading by the ICTR as “an unjustiﬁ-
ably liberal interpretation both of the terms of the Convention, and the intention of
the drafters which the Tribunal purported to be at pains to respect.”
54 Olympia Bekou, above n.48, 681-2.
55 Penal Code of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (2009), art. 123.
56 Genocide Convention, above n.39, art. II: “to destroy, in whole or in part, a na-
tional, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such”.
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(e) Acts that prevent the group in a violent manner from settling or
remaining in a geographic space that is, by tradition or historically,
recognized as their own;
(f) Subjection of the group to cruel, degrading or inhumane conditions
of existence and treatment, which may cause its total or partial
destruction;
(g) Widespread conﬁscation or seizure of property owned by members of
the group;
(h) Prohibition of members of the group from carrying out certain trade,
industrial or professional activities;
(i) Spread of an epidemic that may cause the death of members of the
group or offences to their physical integrity;
(j) Prohibition, omission or hindrance by any means from providing
members of the group with humanitarian assistance required to com-
bat epidemic situations or severe food shortages[.]57
19. On the one hand, the East Timorese national implementing legislation
appears to expand on the conduct that can, if committed with the intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as
such, constitute the crime of genocide under the Rome Statute. On the other
hand, subsections e) to j) of the East Timorese Criminal Code could be
viewed as elaborating on Article 6(c) of the Rome Statute, which criminalizes
“deliberately inﬂicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part”.58 Either way, such overcri-
minilization ought not to risk a negative ﬁnding on the part of the Court
should it make a complementarity assessment in the future.
20. The Cambodian Criminal Code also appears to contain a broader deﬁ-
nition of genocide than that contained in the Genocide Convention and
Rome Statute with respect to imposing measures intended to prevent births
within the group.59 Cambodia’s national implementing legislation proscribes
“imposing forceful measures or voluntary means intended to prevent births
57 Penal Code of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, above n.55, art. 123.
58 Rome Statute, above n.1, art. 6(c).
59 See Simon M. Meisenberg, above n.8, 127-8. On the actus reus of genocide by
deliberately inﬂicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part, see also William A. Schabas, above n.43,
188-97.
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within the group”.60 Meisenberg accurately observes that this provision is un-
likely to lead to practical consequences for any possible complementarity de-
termination that the ICC might make in the future, rightly suggesting that
“the requirements of this crime will hardly be met if the persons are informed
and understand the consequences of the family planning programme”.61 In
other words, measures intended to prevent births within a protected group
cannot be imposed voluntarily, but, as implied by the term “imposed”, must
be coercive.62
21. In contrast, the deﬁnition of genocide in the Criminal Code of
Mongolia is as follows:
302. Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such
killing of members of the group; causing grave bodily injuries to mem-
bers of the group; imposing measures intended to prevent births within
the group; forcibly transferring children of the group to another group
or deliberately inﬂicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part[.]63
22. This approach therefore falls into the second category, being under-
inclusive in terms of the genocidal acts enumerated in the Genocide
Convention and the Rome Statute. Although the Mongolian Criminal Code
largely follows the deﬁnition agreed in the Genocide Convention verbatim, it
omits “causing serious . . . mental harm” to members of the protected groups
in the list of genocidal acts.64 From the perspective of international criminal
law, to restrict the actus reus for genocide in this manner may trigger the juris-
diction of the ICC according to the principle of complementarity, by virtue of
the inconsistency between domestic law and the Rome Statute. In other
words, according to Kleffner, “when domestic law criminalizes a narrower
range of conduct than the Statute . . . States risk relinquishing their
60 Criminal Code of the Kingdom of Cambodia (2012), art. 183(4) (emphasis added).
For translations into English of provisions from the Criminal Code, the author uses
Bunleng Cheung, Criminal Code, Khmer-English Translation (2011).
61 Simon M. Meisenberg, above n.8, 127-8.
62 Ibid., 127.
63 Criminal Code of Mongolia (2002), art. 302.
64 Ibid. Cf. Rome Statute, above n.1, art. 6(b).
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competence to investigate and prosecute, because the ICC may declare them
to be ‘unable’ [to do so]”.65
23. As for under-inclusiveness with respect to the speciﬁc intent required
for genocide, it is signiﬁcant that, in its national implementing legislation,
Bangladesh uses the term “such as” instead of “as such”, the wording used in
the Genocide Convention and the Rome Statute.66 Though conceivably
unintentional, the adoption of this wording by the Bangladeshi drafters could
have practical consequences. According to Suzannah Linton:
The “as such” emphasises the prohibited targeting of protected groups,
. . . a critical aspect of the concept of genocide. The ultimate target is the
group, and individuals are targeted because they are members of the
group. The “as such” underscores that. In Section 3(2)(c) of the
International Crimes (Tribunals) Act As Amended, the turn to “such as”
not just shifts the emphasis away from the targeting of the protected
groups to the core crimes, but it also turns the Genocide Convention’s
closed list of core crimes into a merely illustrative list.67
24. This “watering down”, however inadvertent, of the deﬁnition of the crime
of genocide could lead to the Court ﬁnding Bangladesh unable to investigate
and prosecute the offence before its national courts, should the ICC be faced
with making such an assessment in the future in accordance with the principle
of complementarity.
III.A.ii. Crimes against humanity
25. There is no speciﬁc international convention akin to those addressing the
crime of genocide and war crimes governing crimes against humanity.68 As a
result, the latter were not widely criminalized in the domestic legal
65 Jann K. Kleffner, The Impact of Complementarity on National Implementation of
Substantive International Criminal Law, 1 JICJ (2003), 86, 101. See also Julio
Bacio Terracino, National Implementation of ICC Crimes: Impact on National
Jurisdictions and the ICC, 5 JICJ (2007), 421.
66 The International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973, above n.50, s. 3(2)(c).
67 Suzannah Linton, above n.7, 245-6 (footnote omitted).
68 This lacuna may, however, soon be ﬁlled with the International Law Commission
(ILC) deciding to add the topic of crimes against humanity to its work programme
at its 66th session. See ILC, Report on the Work of its sixty-sixth session (5 May to
6 June and 7 July to 8 August 2014), 265. See also, on the production of a draft
convention to meet the need for treaty on crimes against humanity, Leila N. Sadat
(ed.), Forging a Convention for Crimes against Humanity (2014).
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frameworks of Asian States at the time the Rome Statute entered into force in
July 2002. One exception is Bangladesh, whose national implementing legis-
lation, The International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973, criminalizes:
(a) Crimes against Humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslave-
ment, deportation, imprisonment, abduction, conﬁnement, torture,
rape or other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population
or persecutions on political, racial, ethnic or religious grounds, whether
or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where
perpetrated[.]69
26. The deﬁnition adopted by the Bangladeshi drafters largely appears to re-
ﬂect the wording of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal and
Control Council Law No. 10, both of which adopted and entered into force
in 1945.70 The deﬁnition chosen by Bangladesh adds abduction and conﬁne-
ment to the prohibited conduct for crimes against humanity under its domes-
tic law, neither of which appear in the 1945 instruments. The Bangladeshi
deﬁnition also includes ethnic grounds among the list of grounds on which
the crime against humanity of persecution can be founded, a category not in-
cluded in the 1945 deﬁnitions thereof. It is certainly praiseworthy that
Bangladesh has the capacity to investigate and prosecute certain crimes against
humanity at the domestic level, as will be demonstrated below with regard to
speciﬁc offences, its deﬁnition falls short of the conduct criminalized by the
Rome Statute. Should Bangladeshi authorities and the ICC seek to simulta-
neously investigate or prosecute conduct within the jurisdiction of the latter,
the Court could ﬁnd Bangladesh “unable . . . to carry out the investigation or
prosecution”,71 in determining whether the case is admissible under Article
17(1) of the Rome Statute, i.e. pursuant to the principle of complementarity.
27. Perhaps partly as a result of crimes against humanity not having been
implemented into national legal orders prior to the entry into force of the
ICC Statute, unlike as with genocide and war crimes, a number of Asian State
Parties thereto do not explicitly criminalize crimes against humanity in their
69 The International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973, above n.50, s. 3(2)(a).
70 Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 82 UNTS 279, art. 6(c); Control
Council Law No. 10, 3 Ofﬁcial Gazette of the Control Council for Germany
(1946), 50, art. II(1)(c). See also Suzannah Linton, above n.7, 231.
71 Rome Statute, above n.1, art. 17(1)(a).
Birkett, Twenty Years of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/chinesejil/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/chinesejil/jm
z014/5542056 by U
niversity of N
orthum
bria at N
ew
castle user on 03 O
ctober 2019
respective domestic laws. These are Afghanistan, Japan, Jordan,72 Maldives,
Mongolia, Palestine, and Tajikistan.
28. Turning to those Asian State Parties to the Rome Statute that have
implemented the deﬁnition and prohibition of crimes against humanity in
their national legal orders, as with implementing the deﬁnition and prohibi-
tion of the crime of genocide, certain States make explicit reference to the
Rome Statute. For example, “. . . ‘crime against humanity’ means any of the
acts speciﬁed in article 7 of the Rome Statute” according to the national
implementing legislation enacted by the Republic of Cyprus in 2006.73
29. Similar to the implementation of the deﬁnition and prohibition of the
crime of genocide, under-inclusiveness in terms of grounds on which the
crime against humanity of persecution, listed in Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome
Statute,74 may be committed can be viewed in the national implementing leg-
islation enacted by certain Asian ICC State Parties. For example, Bangladesh
restricts the offence to “persecutions on political, racial, ethnic or religious
grounds”,75 omitting a number of other grounds contained in the Rome
Statute, namely national grounds, gender grounds, and other grounds that are
universally recognized as impermissible under international law. Likewise,
Cambodia proscribes “persecution against any identiﬁable group or collectiv-
ity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious or gender
grounds”,76 but omits the ﬁnal category provided in the ICC Statute: other
grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international
law. As noted above with respect to under-inclusiveness in deﬁning the crime
of genocide in national legislation, restrictions in terms of the crime against
humanity of persecution could lead the Court to ﬁnd that Bangladesh and
72 Jordan does, however, possess draft national implementing legislation, which, except
for its failure to include “other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally
causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health”,
reﬂects the Rome Statute deﬁnition of crimes against humanity. See Ibrahim Aljazy,
above n.47, 192.
73 Cyprus Rome Statute Ratiﬁcation Law, above n.44, s. 2.
74 Rome Statute, above n.1, art. 7(1)(h) states: “[p]ersecution against any identiﬁable
group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender
. . . or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under interna-
tional law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime
within the jurisdiction of the Court”).
75 The International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973, above n.50, s. 3(2)(a).
76 Criminal Code of the Kingdom of Cambodia, above n.60, art. 188(8).
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Cambodia are unable to try these offences at the national level, if a comple-
mentarity determination were to be made. In contrast, the Philippines’ na-
tional implementing legislation prohibits “[p]ersecution against any
identiﬁable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural,
religious, gender, sexual orientation or other grounds that are universally rec-
ognized as impermissible under international law”.77 This approach is faithful
to the deﬁnition in the Rome Statute,78 while also explicitly recognizing sex-
ual orientation as a ground on which the crime against humanity of persecu-
tion as a can be founded.79 Other States adhere even more closely to the
wording contained in the Rome Statute. For example, Timor-Leste’s national
implementing legislation deﬁnes the crime against humanity of persecution in
the following terms:
. . . deprivation of the exercise of fundamental rights contrary to in-
ternational law against a group or a collective entity due to politics,
race, nationality, ethnicity, culture, religion, gender or for any other
reason universally recognized as unacceptable under international
law[.]80
30. Similarly, the legislation adopted by the Republic of Korea to
criminalize genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes at the
domestic level, as well as to give effect to the Rome Statute coopera-
tion regime domestically, deﬁnes the crime against humanity of perse-
cution as: “[d]epriving a member of a group or collectivity of his/her
fundamental human rights or restricting his/her fundamental human
rights on political, racial, national, ethnical, cultural, religious, gender
or other grounds recognized as impermissible under international
laws”.81
77 Philippine IHL Act, above n.51, s. 6(h).
78 H. Harry L. Roque, Jr., Combating Impunity: Legal Nuances of the Philippine
IHL Act and the Philippine Ratiﬁcation of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, 4 Asia-Paciﬁc YIHL (2008-2011), 262, 265.
79 On the crime against humanity of persecution on gender grounds encompassing
persecution based on sexual orientation, see, e.g., Valerie Oosterveld, Constructive
Ambiguity and the Meaning of “Gender” for the International Criminal Court, 16
International Feminist Journal of Politics (2014), 563, 568-73.
80 Penal Code of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, above n.55, art. 124(h).
81 Korean ICC Act, above n.45, art. 9(2)(7).
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31. One notable omission in the national implementing legislation of most
Asian ICC State Parties is the requirement under Article 7(2)(a) of the Rome
Statute, namely that:
“Attack directed against any civilian population” means a course of
conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in
paragraph 1 against any civilian population, pursuant to or in fur-
therance of a State or organizational policy to commit such
attack[.]
32. Of the 13 Asian State Parties to the ICC Statute, only the Republic of
Korea82 and Cyprus83 incorporate this “policy requirement” into their respec-
tive national implementing legislation. Another potential omission in the na-
tional implementing legislation enacted by some Asian State Parties to the
Rome Statute might have been the residual Article 7(1)(k), i.e. the crime
against humanity of “other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally
causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical
health”.84 Bekou observes: “it is foreseeable that states could take issue with
its implementation owing to a potential conﬂict with the legality principle,
which requires the strict deﬁnition of the crimes”.85 This concern has been
expressed in Asia. For example, Jordan has shown its apprehension with re-
gard to the breadth of the deﬁnition of “other inhumane acts”. According to
Ibrahim Aljazy, Article 12 of the 2008 draft Jordanian national implementing
legislation:
reproduces the deﬁnition of crimes against humanity found in article
7(1)(a-j) of the . . . Rome Statute but omits the text of article 7(1)(k),
namely ‘[o]ther inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally caus-
ing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical
82 Korean ICC Act, above n.45, art. 9(1): “. . . an extensive or systematic attack di-
rected against any civilian population in connection with the policies of the State,
organizations or institutions to commit such attack”. See also art. 18, which permits
Korean courts to take the Elements of Crimes into account in accordance with art. 9
of the Rome Statute.
83 Cyprus Rome Statute Ratiﬁcation Law, above n.44, s. 2, incorporating the require-
ment by reference. See also s. 5, which instructs Cypriot courts to take the Elements
of Crimes into account in their interpretation and application of arts. 6, 7, and 8(2)
of the Rome Statute.
84 Rome Statute, above n.1, art. 7(1)(k).
85 Olympia Bekou, above n.48, 684.
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health’. This reﬂects concerns that the broad deﬁnition contained in
article 7(1)(k) of the Rome Statute may prompt national judges to ﬁnd
certain conduct to constitute crimes against humanity contrary to the in-
tention of the legislature.86
33. Despite such consternation on the part of Jordan, such concerns have not
been borne out in the practice of the Asian ICC State Parties to have imple-
mented the deﬁnition and prohibition of crimes against humanity in their re-
spective national laws.87 Bangladesh,88 Cambodia,89 Cyprus,90 the
Philippines,91 the Republic of Korea,92 and Timor-Leste93 all criminalize this
residual, but no less signiﬁcant, category of crimes against humanity in their
national implementing legislation.
III.A.iii. War crimes
34. As with the crime of genocide, several States had proscribed war crimes in
their respective domestic criminal laws before they ratiﬁed the ICC Statute.
This can be attributed to States’ efforts to incorporate the four Geneva
Conventions (1949) and their Additional Protocols I and II (1977) into their
national legal orders.94 All 13 Asian State Parties to the ICC Statute have also
86 Ibrahim Aljazy, above n.47, 192.
87 Olympia Bekou, above n.48, 684 reaches a similar conclusion with regard to non-
Asian State Parties to the Rome Statute, making reference to the national imple-
menting legislation of Belgium, Georgia, Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Trinidad and Tobago, and the United Kingdom.
88 The International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973, above n.50, s. 3(2)(a).
89 Criminal Code of the Kingdom of Cambodia, above n.60, art. 188(11).
90 Cyprus Rome Statute Ratiﬁcation Law, above n.44, s. 2.
91 Philippine IHL Act, above n.51, s. 6(k).
92 Korean ICC Act, above n.45, art. 9(2)(9).
93 Penal Code of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, above n.55, art. 124(k).
94 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949, 75 UNTS 31; Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of August 12, 1949, 75 UNTS 85;
Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August
1949, 75 UNTS 135; Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287; Protocol Additional to
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conﬂicts, 1125 UNTS 3; Protocol Additional to
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ratiﬁed the four Geneva Conventions (GC I-IV) as well as Additional
Protocols I and II thereto (AP I and AP II, respectively). In addition, Cyprus,
Palestine, the Philippines, and Timor-Leste have also ratiﬁed the third, and
most recently agreed, Additional Protocol thereto (AP III). Asian ICC State
Parties’ respective dates of ratiﬁcation of, or accession to, these international
humanitarian law (IHL) instruments are shown in the following table:
35. However, despite such widespread ratiﬁcation, it must be noted that
Afghanistan, Maldives, and Palestine do not criminalize war crimes in their re-
spective domestic legislation, though the latter has taken steps to address this
situation by establishing a National Commission for the Implementation of
Table 3.
State Party GC I-IV95 AP I96 AP II97 AP III98
Afghanistan 26.09.1956 10.11.2009 10.11.2009
Bangladesh 04.04.1972 08.09.1980 08.09.1980
Cambodia 08.12.1958 14.01.1998 14.01.1998
Cyprus 23.05.1962 01.06.1979 18.03.1996 27.11.2007
Japan 21.04.1953 31.08.2004 31.08.2004
Jordan 29.05.1951 01.05.1979 01.05.1979
Maldives 18.06.1991 03.09.1991 03.09.1991
Mongolia 20.12.1958 06.12.1995 06.12.1995
Palestine 02.04.2014 02.04.2014 04.01.2015 04.01.2015
The Philippines 06.10.1952 30.03.2012 11.12.1986 22.08.2006
Republic of Korea 16.08.1966 15.01.1982 15.01.1982
Tajikistan 13.01.1993 13.01.1993 13.01.1993
Timor-Leste 08.05.2003 12.04.2005 12.04.2005 29.07.2011
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of Non-International Armed Conﬂicts, 1125 UNTS 609. On the exercise
of jurisdiction over serious violations of IHL in the domestic courts of the
Philippines before the entry into force of its national implementing legislation, see
H. Harry L. Roque, Jr., above n.78, 267-9.
95 Information on the ratiﬁcation status of the four Geneva Conventions and their
three Additional Protocols is available via the website of the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). See ICRC, Geneva Conventions of 1949 and
Additional Protocols, and their Commentaries, (ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/
ihl.nsf/vwTreaties1949.xsp>).
96 Ibid.
97 ICRC, above n.95.
98 Ibid.
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IHL on 13 January 2016.99 The Commission is responsible for, inter alia,
reviewing existing legislation and submitting proposals for its development,
including draft laws, for its harmonization with the provisions of IHL.100
36. At the same time, because certain States had criminalized war crimes
when ratifying the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, as
with the incorporation the crime of genocide into domestic law, they adopted
the deﬁnitions contained therein. This was again done by replicating their
wording or by making direct references thereto. Mongolia follows the second
method in its Criminal Code, which provides as follows, in relevant part:
Article 299. Conduct of war by prohibited means
299.1. Cruel treatment of the captives and civilians, displacement of the
population, looting of the historical and cultural values in the occupied
territory or use of the means of warfare prohibited by an international
treaty to which Mongolia is a party shall be punishable by imprisonment
for a term of more than 10 to 15 years.101
37. The “international treat[ies] to which Mongolia is a party” in this context
include the Rome Statute102 as well as the four Geneva Conventions and their
ﬁrst two Additional Protocols.103 Bangladesh adopts a similar approach by, in
addition to proscribing a number of named war crimes,104 prohibiting the
“violation of any humanitarian rules applicable in armed conﬂicts laid down
in the Geneva Conventions of 1949”.105 As for making an explicit reference
to the ICC Statute, according to the national implementing legislation of the
99 See Palestine, Decree No. (2) for the Year 2016 on the Establishment of the
Palestinian National Committee for International Humanitarian Law (2016) (muq-
taﬁ.birzeit.edu/pg/getleg.asp?id¼16770).
100 Ibid.
101 Criminal Code of Mongolia, above n.63, art. 299.
102 See Table 2.
103 See Table 3.
104 See The International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973, above n.50, s. 3(2)(d), crimi-
nalizing “violation of laws or customs of war which include but are not limited to
murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labour or for any other purpose of civil-
ian population in the territory of Bangladesh; murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of
war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages and detenues, plunder of public or pri-
vate property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not jus-
tiﬁed by military necessity”.
105 The International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973, above n.50, s. 3(2)(e).
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Republic of Cyprus: “‘war crime’ means any of the acts speciﬁed in article 8.2
of the Rome Statute”.106
38. As for Asian State Parties to the Rome Statute that have not imple-
mented war crimes by reference to the Geneva Conventions or the constituent
instrument of the Court, there are a number of offences that are contained in
these instruments but which are omitted in States’ national implementing leg-
islation. As Meisenberg notes, there are 72 war crimes provisions contained in
the Rome Statute,107 which can be sub-divided into eight grave breaches of the
four Geneva Conventions and 64 war crimes that can be perpetrated in inter-
national armed conﬂicts (IACs) and non-international armed conﬂicts
(NIACs).108 Though the ICC Statute draws a distinction between the types of
armed conﬂict for the purpose of deﬁning the war crimes proscribed therein,
this does not mean that States need necessarily do the same when implement-
ing. Nonetheless, should they omit to implement the deﬁnition and prohibi-
tion of offences in their domestic laws, entirely or in relation to a particular
form of armed conﬂict, that are criminalized in the ICC Statute, they leave
themselves susceptible to a negative ﬁnding by the Court, should it have to
make a determination of their “ability” to investigate and/or prosecute war
crimes in line with the principle of complementarity. A number of notable and
common aberrations from the war crimes deﬁnitions enumerated in the Rome
Statute will now be examined in turn.
39. Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions are the only Rome Statute
crimes explicitly criminalized by Japan, with the other offences punishable as
“ordinary” domestic crimes.109 This approach can be partly explained by
obstacles arising from Japan’s paciﬁst post-World War II Constitution, which
restrained its capacity to investigate and prosecute war crimes at the domestic
level.110 Following a series of legislative changes, Japan moved to criminalize
106 Cyprus Rome Statute Ratiﬁcation Law, above n.44, s. 2.
107 Simon M. Meisenberg, above n.8, 129.
108 Simon M. Meisenberg, above n.8, 132.
109 See Shuichi Furuya, above n.9, 46. See also Jens Meierhenrich and Keiko Ko, above
n.9, 256, who argue that such an approach “is not commensurable with the purpose
of the Rome Statute because it disregards the important fact that the codiﬁcation of
international crimes – genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes – is, un-
like the codiﬁcation of domestic crimes, aimed at safeguarding not only the interests
of individuals, but also the interests of the international community as a whole.”
110 See Jens Meierhenrich and Keiko Ko, above n.9, 238-41.
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grave breaches of the Geneva Convention in 2004.111 Speciﬁcally, the
Japanese legislation proscribes war crimes against cultural property,112 delays
in the repatriation of prisoners of war,113 transferring parts of its own popula-
tion into occupied territory,114 and preventing the departure of civilians from
occupied territory.115 At the same time, the 2004 legislation also brought
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions into the remit of punishable offen-
ces in the Japanese Criminal Code.116 Despite this arguably momentous legis-
lative step for Japan, the “ordinary” crimes approach leaves the Japanese
authorities open to a negative ﬁnding in terms of their ability to investigate
and/or prosecute crimes other than those explicitly listed in its legislation if
ICC investigators were to simultaneously examine such offences.117
40. Turning from an Asian State Party to the Rome Statute that adopts a
“minimalist”,118 or “thin”,119 approach to national implementing legislation
to a State that adopts a “maximalist position”,120 or a “thick” approach,121 i.e.
the Republic of Korea, aberrations from the Rome Statute deﬁnition of war
crimes can still be observed. For example, as shown by Tae Hyun Choi and
Sangkul Kim, the war crimes of inhuman treatment in IACs,122 cruel treat-
ment in NIACs,123 biological experiments in IACs,124 and ordering the dis-
placement of the civilian population in NIACs125 do not have equivalent
111 Law Concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian
Law (2005).
112 Ibid., art. 3.
113 Ibid., art. 4.
114 Ibid., art. 5.
115 Ibid., art. 6.
116 Ibid., art. 7 and Annex, art. 3. See also Jens Meierhenrich and Keiko Ko, above n.9,
241-42.
117 See Shuichi Furuya, above n.9, 46.
118 Ibid., at 41-42. See also Jens Meierhenrich and Keiko Ko, above n.9, 242-43; LEE
Keun-Gwan, above n.10, 65.
119 LEE Keun-Gwan, above n.10, 64.
120 Jens Meierhenrich and Keiko Ko, above n.9, 242-43. See also Shuichi Furuya,
above n.9, 41.
121 LEE Keun-Gwan, above n.10, 64.
122 Cf. Rome Statute, above n.1, art. 8(2)(a)(ii).
123 Cf. ibid., art. 8(2)(c)(i).
124 Cf. ibid., art. 8(2)(a)(ii).
125 Cf. ibid., art. 8(2)(e)(viii).
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provisions in Korea’s national implementing legislation.126 At the same time,
with several provisions, the Korean national implementing legislation expands
certain protections afforded under IACs in the Rome Statute to NIACs. For
example, the war crimes of wilfully causing great suffering and deportation or
transfer, and criminalized in IACs under the Rome Statute,127 are also prohib-
ited in NIACs under the Korean domestic implementing legislation.128
Similarly, the war crime of passing sentences or the carrying out of executions
without due process having been afforded to the convicted person, prohibited
in NIACs under the ICC Statute,129 is also proscribed in IACs in Korea’s na-
tional implementing legislation.130 Despite a few aberrations, Korea’s overall
approach to implementing the Rome Statute has rightly drawn praise for pro-
viding clarity. As Lee argues in relation to the Korean (and German) national
implementing legislation:
By transposing Article 8(2) of the Rome Statute . . . in an idiosyncratic
way, the drafters of the German and Korean acts also purported to en-
hance the domestic operationality of the category of war crimes, in addi-
tion to increasing the overall speciﬁcity and clarity of the category of war
crime. National judges are in general not familiar with international law
. . . Interpretation and application of Article 8 of the Rome Statute that
is very long and tortuous should pose a highly daunting challenge to
them. Sub-dividing the sprawling category of war crimes as provided for
in the Rome Statute into 5 sub-categories should lessen the complexity
126 Tae Hyun Choi and Sangkul Kim, above n.10, 610. Choi and Kim also argue that
the passing of sentences or the carrying out of executions without due process having
been afforded to the convicted person in NIACs, found in art. 8(2)(c)(iv) of the
Rome Statute, is not reﬂected in Korea’s implementing legislation. But see Korean
ICC Act, above n.45, art. 10(3)(2): “Passing sentence upon any person protected
pursuant to international laws on humanity or carrying out such sentence, without
undergoing a fair and regular trial”, which is prohibited under the Korean national
implementing legislation in both IACs and NIACs.
127 See Rome Statute, above n.1, art. 8(2)(a)(iii) (wilfully causing great suffering) and
arts. 8(2)(a)(vii) and 8(2)(b)(viii) (deportation or transfer).
128 Korean ICC Act, above n.45, art. 10(2)(2) (wilfully causing great suffering) and art..
10(3)(1) (deportation or transfer). See also Tae Hyun Choi and Sangkul Kim, above
n.10, 610.
129 Rome Statute, above n.1, art. 8(2)(c)(iv).
130 Korean ICC Act, above n.45, art. 10(3)(2). Cf. Tae Hyun Choi and Sangkul Kim,
above n.10, 610.
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of the provision, thereby rendering it more manageable and operational
to domestic judges.131
41. As with the drafters of Korea’s national implementing legislation, the
drafters of Timor-Leste’s national war crimes provisions similarly sub-divided
Article 8(2) of the ICC Statute into several categories,132 while also providing
for the prohibition of many offences in both IACs and NIACs.133
Additionally, in its Penal Code, Timor-Leste extends the Rome Statute of-
fence of conscripting or enlisting children under the age of ﬁfteen years into
the national armed forces, or, in the case of NIACs, armed forces or groups,
or using them to participate actively in hostilities,134 to cover children under
the age of eighteen.135 Timor-Leste’s Penal Code also prohibits a number of
means of warfare beyond the scope of the war crimes listed in the Rome
Statute, including the use of antipersonnel landmines,136 chemical weap-
ons,137 incendiary weapons,138 and laser weapons capable of causing blind-
131 LEE Keun-Gwan, above n.10, 70.
132 Penal Code of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, above n.55, arts. 125-30.
The sub-categories are as follows: 1. War crimes against individuals; 2. War crimes
committed using prohibited methods of warfare; 3. War crimes committed using
prohibited means of warfare; 4. War crimes against assets protected by insignia or
distinctive emblems; 5. War crimes against property; and 6. War crimes against
other rights.
133 Ibid. Cf. art. 125(3), restricting the following war crimes to IACs:
Any person who, within the context of an armed conﬂict of an international
nature:
(a) Transfers, directly or indirectly, as an occupying power, parts of its own civil-
ian population into the territory it occupies, or transfers all or parts of the popu-
lation of the occupied territory within or outside this territory;
(b) Compels a prisoner of war or other protected person to serve in the armed
forces of a hostile power;
(c) Delays, after cessation of hostilities, and without a justiﬁed reason, repatria-
tion of prisoners of war.
134 Rome Statute, above n.1, art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi) (for IACs) and art. 8(2)(e)(vii) (for
NIACs).
135 Penal Code of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, above n.55, art. 125(1)(e).
136 Ibid., art. 127(2)(d).
137 Ibid., art. 127(2)(e).
138 Ibid., art. 127(2)(g).
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ness in their victim(s).139 In sum, therefore, despite some aberrations,140
Timor-Leste implements the ICC Statute war crimes regime in a clear man-
ner, capable of straightforward application by national judges. Lee’s high
praise for the Korean (and German) national implementing legislation can
therefore be extended to the Penal Code of the Democratic Republic of
Timor-Leste.
42. The Tajik Criminal Code also divides the war crimes its criminalizes
into sub-categories and, without exception, legislates for the prohibition of all
enumerated war crimes in IACs and NIACs,141 thereby providing protection
beyond the ICC Statute regime with respect to the offences listed. Despite
expanding protection with respect to certain offences, however, there are a
number of discrepancies between the war crimes included in the Tajik
Criminal Code and those listed in the ICC Statute. By way of example, the
Tajik Criminal Code does not criminalize the Rome Statute war crimes of
“rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, as deﬁned in ar-
ticle 7, paragraph 2 (f), enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual vio-
lence also constituting [in the case of IACs] a grave breach of the Geneva
Conventions”,142 or, in the case of NIACs, “also constituting a serious viola-
tion of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions”.143 Nor does
Tajikistan prohibit the ICC Statute crime of conscripting or enlisting children
under the age of ﬁfteen years into, in the case of IACs the national armed
forces, or, in the case of NIACs, armed forces or groups, or using them to par-
ticipate actively in hostilities.144 As noted with respect to the crime of geno-
cide and crimes against humanity, this leaves Tajikistan susceptible to being
deemed “unable” to investigate or prosecute these offences by the Court,
should it make such a determination in accordance with the principle of com-
plementarity in the event of an ICC investigation.
43. As for Cambodia and Jordan, both States have incorporated the ICC
Statute war crimes scheme in their respective national legal orders to a large
139 Ibid., art. 127(2)(h).
140 For example, ibid., art. 125(1)(h) restricts the war crime of “[e]xtensive destruction
and appropriation of property, not justiﬁed by military necessity and carried out un-
lawfully and wantonly” in, art. 8(2)(a)(iv) of the Rome Statute to “property of high
value”.
141 Criminal Code of the Republic of Tajikistan, above n.46, arts 403 and 404.
142 Rome Statute, above n.1, art. 8(2)(b)(xxii).
143 Ibid., art. 8(2)(e)(vi).
144 Ibid., art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi) (for IACs) and art. 8(2)(e)(vii) (for NIACs).
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extent. With regard to the former, Meisenberg identiﬁes the decision taken by
legislators not to distinguish between IACs and NIACs in the Cambodian
Criminal Code.145 This method therefore resembles the approach taken by
Korea, Timor-Leste, and Tajikistan. At the same time, Meisenberg also singles
out notable aberrations between the war crimes proscribed by Cambodia and
those listed in the Rome Statute,146 leading to the conclusion that “this raises
concerns about the ability of the Cambodian judiciary to prosecute and pun-
ish certain war crimes and may thereby render it ‘unable to carry out its pro-
ceedings’ under Article 17(3) of the ICC Statute”.147 A similar conclusion
could equally apply to Jordan, which, though the Military Penal Code prohib-
its certain war crimes,148 many offences listed in the ICC Statute have only
been incorporated into Jordan’s draft national implementing legislation,149
which, at the time of writing, is not yet in force, thereby leaving Jordan ex-
posed to a negative ﬁnding in the event of an Article 17(3) determination by
the Court. As demonstrated in this section, this risk is not unique to Jordan
and Cambodia. The domestic legislation implementing the Rome Statute
enacted by Japan, Korea, Tajikistan, and Timor-Leste all omit certain war
crimes listed in Article 8(2).
III.A.iv. The crime of aggression
44. The ICC has only been able to exercise jurisdiction over the fourth crime
listed in the Rome Statute, the crime of aggression, since 17 July 2018. A deﬁ-
nition of the crime could not be agreed at the Diplomatic Conference which
culminated in the adoption of the Rome Statute 20 years earlier on 17 July
1998 and the Court’s jurisdiction over aggression was therefore deferred until
145 Simon M. Meisenberg, above n.8, 129.
146 Ibid., 134.
147 Ibid., 135.
148 Ibrahim Aljazy, above n.47, 192 (“Articles 13-16 of the draft law also provide for a
detailed description of war crimes. This includes war crimes against persons, attacks
on properties, attacks on humanitarian operations and their emblems, and several
crimes relating to the methods of combat, which apply to both international and
non-international armed conﬂict in line with article 8 of the . . . Rome Statute. In
addition to the provisions included in the draft law, the Jordanian Penal Military
Code number 58 of 2006 also deals with war crimes. This includes article 41 of the
Penal Military Code, which was inserted with a view to implementing the . . . Rome
Statute, and sets out a list of acts that are considered war crimes if committed during
armed conﬂicts.”)
149 Ibrahim Aljazy, above n.47, 192.
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a later date.150 A deﬁnition of aggression and the conditions for the exercise of
jurisdiction over the crime by the Court were eventually agreed by delegates
to the Review Conference of the Rome Statute, held in Kampala, Uganda,
from 31 May to 11 June 2010. These were inserted into the Rome Statute as
Article 8 bis,151 Article 15 bis,152 and Article 15 ter,153 respectively.154 After
the threshold of 30 ratiﬁcations of the Kampala amendments, as required by
Article 15 bis and Article 15 ter,155 had been met, the Assembly of States
Parties decided, on 14 December 2017, to activate the Court’s jurisdiction
over aggression as of 17 July 2018,156 a symbolic date. It is consequently un-
derstandable that the crime of aggression as deﬁned in Kampala does not fea-
ture in many States’ national implementing legislation at the time of
writing.157 Asian State Parties to the ICC Statute are no exception to this
150 See Rome Statute, above n.1, former art. 5(2) (“The Court shall exercise jurisdiction
over the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted in accordance with articles
121 and 123 deﬁning the crime and setting out the conditions under which the
Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime. Such a provision shall be
consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.”) This
provision was deleted in accordance with Resolution RC/Res.6, adopted at the 13th
plenary meeting of the Review Conference of the Rome Statute on 11 June 2010.
See ICC Assembly of States Parties (ASP), Resolution RC/Res.6: The Crime of
Aggression (2010), Annex I.
151 Rome Statute, above n.1, art. 8 bis
152 Ibid., art. 15 bis.
153 Ibid., art. 15 ter.
154 See The crime of aggression, above n.150, annex I.
155 Rome Statute, above n.1, art. 15 bis(2) and (3) and art. 15 ter(2) and (3) are
verbatim:
2. The Court may exercise jurisdiction only with respect to crimes of aggression
committed one year after the ratiﬁcation or acceptance of the amendments by
thirty States Parties.
3. The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in accor-
dance with this article, subject to a decision to be taken after 1 January 2017 by
the same majority of States Parties as is required for the adoption of an amendment
to the Statute.
156 ASP, Resolution ICC-ASP/16/Res.5: Activation of the Jurisdiction of the Court
over the Crime of Aggression (2017), para.1.
157 Young Sok Kim, a member of the Korean Government Task Force team responsible
for drafting national implementing legislation for the Republic of Korea, opines as
follows: “The Korean ICC Act does not deal with the crime of aggression even
though the crime of aggression is a crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC. The
reason is that, at the time of enacting the Act, there was no provision deﬁning the
crime of aggression and setting out the conditions under which the ICC exercises its
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general trend. Afghanistan, Cambodia, Cyprus, Japan, Jordan, Maldives,
Palestine, the Philippines, and the Republic of Korea possess no domestic le-
gal provisions proscribing aggression.
45. Other Asian ICC State Parties do criminalize aggression, at least
to a certain extent. For example, Bangladesh criminalizes the follow-
ing: “Crimes against Peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation
or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of international
treaties, agreements or assurances”.158 This largely replicates the deﬁni-
tion of crimes against peace adopted by the drafters of the Charter of
the International Military Tribunal, save for the omission of “or par-
ticipation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment
of any of the foregoing” in The International Crimes (Tribunals)
Act, 1973.159 Linton proposes as follows: “[t]his omission may per-
haps reﬂect the continental lawyer’s traditional distaste for this notion
of criminality that is prevalent in the common law system, and
the notion of ‘common plan’ which was very controversial at
Nuremberg”.160
46. Tajikistan criminalizes not only aggression, but also public appeals to
aggressive war in its Criminal Code:
Article 395. Aggressive War
(1) Planning or preparation of an aggressive war is punishable by impris-
onment for 12 to 20 years with conﬁscation of property.
(2) Unleashing or conducting an aggressive war is punishable by impris-
onment for 15 to 20 years with the simultaneous conﬁscation of prop-
erty or death penalty.
Article 396. Public Appeals To Unleashing an Aggressive War
jurisdiction over the crime. However, once such a provision on the crime of aggres-
sion is adopted, the Republic of Korea will be able to amend the Korean ICC Act to
include the crime of aggression in accordance with the provision on the crime of
aggression.” See Young Sok Kim, above n.10, 164 (footnote omitted).
158 The International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973, above n.50, s. 3(2)(b).
159 Charter of the International Military Tribunal, above n.70, art. 6(a).
160 Suzannah Linton, above n.7, 240.
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(1) Public appeals to unleashing an aggressive war is punishable by a ﬁne
of 500 to 1000 times the minimum monthly wage or imprisonment for
a period of 2 to 5 years.
(2) The same actions committed using mass media or by persons who
hold state positions of the Republic of Tajikistan are punishable by im-
prisonment for a period of 7 to 10 years with deprivation of the right to
hold certain positions or be engaged in certain activities for up to 5
years.161
47. In a similar vein, Timor-Leste proscribes incitement to war in its na-
tional implementing legislation:
Article 134. Incitement to war
1. Any person who, by whatever means, publicly and repeatedly, incites
hatred against a race, people or nation, with the intention to provoke
war or prevent peaceful fellowship among different races, peoples or
nations, is punishable with 2 to 8 years imprisonment.
2. Any person who induces or enlists Timorese or foreign nationals to,
in the service of a foreign group or power, wage war against a State or
overthrow the legitimate Government of another State through violent
means, is punishable with 5 to 15 years imprisonment.162
48. Mongolia also adopts a rudimentary deﬁnition of the crime of aggres-
sion in its Criminal Code, as follows:
Article 297. Stirring up of an armed conﬂict
297.1. Stirring up of an international or a local armed conﬂict shall be
punishable by imprisonment for a term of more than 5 to 10 years.163
49. Sergey Sayapin has expressed the opinion that “norms criminalising
propaganda for war . . . reinforce the substantive prohibition of aggression, es-
pecially, at the levels of planning, preparation or initiation”.164 The inclusion
161 Criminal Code of the Republic of Tajikistan, above n.46, arts. 395 and 396.
162 Penal Code of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, above n.55, art. 134.
163 Criminal Code of Mongolia, above n.63, art. 297(1).
164 Sergey Sayapin, The Compatibility of the Rome Statute’s Draft Deﬁnition of the
Crime of Aggression with National Criminal Justice Systems, 81 Revue
Internationale de Droit Pe´nal (2010), 165, 185.
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of such provisions in the national implementing legislation of Tajikistan and
Timor-Leste is therefore welcome from this perspective. At the same time, at
the time of writing, no Asian State Party to the Rome Statute criminalizes the
crime of aggression as deﬁned in Kampala, with few criminalizing the offence
in any form. This leaves Asian ICC State Parties vulnerable to being found
“unable” to investigate and/or prosecute the crime of aggression in the event
of a future complementarity assessment.
III.B. Implementing the ICC Cooperation Regime
50. Article 86 of the ICC Statute contains the explicit, general duty to cooper-
ate with the Court: “States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of
this Statute, cooperate fully with the Court”.165 The obligation to cooperate
with the ICC in the Rome Statute is consequently limited to its State Parties.
An exception to this rule arises where the Situation is referred to the ICC by
the United Nations Security Council, acting pursuant to Article 13(b) of the
ICC Statute.166 States not parties to the Rome Statute can be therefore bound
to cooperate with the Court by virtue of their obligations under the Charter
of the United Nations.167 In addition, Article 12(3) of the ICC Statute allows
States not party thereto to recognize the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC on
an ad hoc basis by lodging a declaration with the Registrar. Coˆte d’Ivoire,168
165 Rome Statute, above n.1, art. 86.
166 Ibid., art. 13 (“The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime re-
ferred to in article 5 in accordance with the provisions of this Statute if: . . . (b) A sit-
uation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is
referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the
Charter of the United Nations”).
167 For the exercise of this power, see SC Res 1593, 31 March 2015, para 2: “Decides
that the Government of Sudan and all other parties to the conﬂict in Darfur, shall
cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the
Prosecutor pursuant to this resolution and, while recognizing that States not party
to the Rome Statute have no obligation under the Statute, urges all States and con-
cerned regional and other international organizations to cooperate fully”; and SC
Res 1970, 26 February 2011, para.5, which adopts the same wording as the 2005
resolution but for being targeted instead at “the Libyan authorities”.
168 See ICC, Prosecutor v. Laurent Koudou Gbagbo, Declaration Accepting the
Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court dated 18 April 2003, 6 September
2012, ICC-02/11-01/11-129-Anx16-tENG.
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Ukraine,169 and Palestine170 have lodged declarations under this mechanism.
In the event of such an ad hoc declaration, Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute
states that: “[t]he accepting State shall cooperate with the Court without any
delay or exception in accordance with Part 9”.171 Further, Article 87(5)(a) of
the ICC Statute provides that: “[t]he Court may invite any State not party to
this Statute to provide assistance under this Part on the basis of an ad hoc ar-
rangement, an agreement with such State or any other appropriate basis”.172
51. Turning to the forms of cooperation required from States subject to a
duty to cooperate, Article 88 of the Rome Statute provides as follows: “State
Parties shall ensure that there are procedures available under their national law
for all of the forms of cooperation” speciﬁed under Part IX.173 State Parties
are therefore obligated to guarantee that there are procedures available to en-
able them to cooperate with the Court. However, States are free to determine
how to implement the cooperation provisions into their respective national
laws. This is an obligation of result: provided that States provide for proce-
dures to facilitate all the forms of cooperation required by the Rome Statute
regime, it does not matter how they do so. Under Part IX of the ICC Statute,
the obligation to cooperate extends to preserving and providing evidence,
sharing information, securing the arrest and surrender of suspects for whom
169 Ukraine has lodged two declarations with the Court’s Registrar under art. 12(3) of
the Rome Statute. See Declaration of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to the
International Criminal Court on the recognition of the jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court by Ukraine over crimes against humanity, committed
by senior ofﬁcials of the state, which led to extremely grave consequences and mass
murder of Ukrainian nationals during peaceful protests within the period 21
November 2013 - 22 February 2014, 25 February 2014 (http://www.legal-tools.
org/doc/1a65fa/); Declaration of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on the recognition
of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court by Ukraine over crimes
against humanity and war crimes committed by senior ofﬁcials of the Russian
Federation and leaders of terrorist organizations “DNR” and “LNR,” which led to
extremely grave consequences and mass murder of Ukrainian nationals, 4 February
2015 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b53005/).
170 Palestine has also submitted two ad hoc declarations in accordance with art. 12(3) of
the Rome Statute. See Declaration Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court, 21 January 2009 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/d9b1c6/) and
Declaration Accepting the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 31
December 2014 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/60aff8/).
171 Rome Statute, above n.1, art. 12(3).
172 Ibid., art. 87(5)(a).
173 Ibid., art. 88.
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arrest warrants have been issued, and protecting victims and witnesses to ICC
proceedings.
52. As of the time of writing, Japan and the Republic of Korea are the only
Asian ICC State Parties to have enacted speciﬁc domestic legislation to give ef-
fect to their obligations under Article 88 of the ICC Statute. Japan does so
through dedicated legislation separate from its (limited) incorporation of
Rome Statute crimes into its domestic legal order,174 while Korea implements
the cooperation regime in the same piece of legislation in which it incorpo-
rates international crimes into Korean law.175 These two laws will now be
compared.
53. Japan’s national implementing legislation on cooperation is a single law
that delineates the procedures according to which the Japanese authorities are
permitted to discharge their duty to cooperate with the Court under the
Rome Statute. Chapter II of the Japanese Act on Cooperation with the
International Criminal Court, which incorporates Japan’s duties under Part
IX of the Rome Statute into Japanese law, is divided into a number of parts:
Section 2 regulates the provision of evidence, documents, and witnesses;176
Section 3 provides for the surrender and detention of accused persons;177 and
Section 4 tackles enforcement measures taken with a view to the imposition
of a ﬁne, forfeiture of assets, or order for reparations.178 Notably, Chapter IV
of the Act pertains to offences against the administration of justice.179 Japan
consequently follows a “thick” approach180 with respect to the implementa-
tion of its obligation to provide for all of the forms of cooperation speciﬁed in
the Rome Statute.
54. In contrast, the Republic of Korea adopts a “highly ‘thin’” approach181
to implementing the Rome Statute cooperation regime, with only two provi-
sions in its legislation intended to give effect to its obligations under Article
88 of the Rome Statute. Article 19 of the Korean ICC Act provides for the
mutatis mutandis application of its national Extradition Act “with respect to
174 Act on Cooperation with the International Criminal Court (2007) (Japan Act on
Cooperation with the ICC).
175 Korean ICC Act, above n.45.
176 Japan Act on Cooperation with the ICC, above n.174, arts. 6-18.
177 Japan Act on Cooperation with the ICC, above n.174, arts. 19-37.
178 Japan Act on Cooperation with the ICC, above n.174, arts. 38-48.
179 Japan Act on Cooperation with the ICC, above n.174, arts. 53-64.
180 LEE Keun-Gwan, above n.10, 75.
181 LEE Keun-Gwan, above n.10, 64.
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the surrender of criminals”,182 while Article 20 of Korea’s national imple-
menting legislation stipulates that “The Act on International Judicial Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters shall apply mutatis mutandis” to cooperation
requests emanating from the Court.183 Both Articles provide that the Rome
Statute shall prevail if either piece of legislation proves inconsistent with the
Court’s constituent instrument. On one hand, such an approach might per-
mit Korea to cooperate with the ICC to a limited extent, for example, with re-
gard to the identiﬁcation of persons or the location of items under Article
93(1)(a) of the Rome Statute, the service of (judicial) documents pursuant to
Article 93(1)(d) thereof, or the execution of searches and seizures in accor-
dance with Article 93(1)(h) of the same instrument.184 On the other hand,
this method can pose practical obstacles. For example, by failing to provide
for procedures enabling the Prosecutor to execute requests directly on Korean
territory without the presence of national authorities in accordance with
Article 99(4) of the Rome Statute,185 Korea is unable to allow for an impor-
tant prosecutorial function required by the ICC Statute cooperation regime.
Nor is Japan, having also chosen not to implement this provision in its legisla-
tion on cooperation. This can be contrasted with the approach followed by
Germany, whose national implementing legislation the Korean team found to
be “of great help” when drafting the law to incorporate the Rome Statute into
the Korean legal order.186 On a related note, Article 99(4)(b) provides that,
“[w]here the requested State Party identiﬁes problems with the execution of a
request pursuant to this subparagraph it shall, without delay, consult with the
Court to resolve the matter.”187 This obligation is additional to the duty in-
cumbent upon ICC State Parties to consult with the ICC more generally
should problems arise when executing requests for cooperation under Article
97 of the Rome Statute.188 This important procedure is more readily given
182 Korean ICC Act, above n.45, art. 19.
183 Korean ICC Act, above n.45, art. 20.
184 Rome Statute, above n.1, arts. 93(1)(a), 93(1)(d), and 93(1)(h). Cf. Act on
International Judicial Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (1991), art. 5, titled
“Scope of Mutual Assistance”.
185 Rome Statute, above n.1, art. 99(4).
186 Young Sok Kim, above n.10, 162. See also Law on Cooperation with the
International Criminal Court (2002), art. 62, titled “Direct Action by the Court”.
187 Rome Statute, above n.1, art. 99(4)(b).
188 Ibid., art. 97.
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effect when incorporated into States’ domestic frameworks, as can be seen in
the Japanese Act on Cooperation with the International Criminal Court:
(1) The Minister of Foreign Affairs shall consult with the ICC, as neces-
sary, with regard to cooperation with the ICC.
(2) When the Minister of Justice ﬁnds it necessary to consult with the
ICC with regard to cooperation with the ICC, he/she shall request the
Minister of Foreign Affairs to seek consultation under the provisions of
the preceding paragraph.189
55. Further, as Lee observes: “[a]side from . . . practical considerations, articu-
lation of the implementing legislation in a meticulous way . . . expresses the
given State’s willingness to faithfully implement the Statute and also provides
moral support to the ICC.”190 In sum, Korea’s legislation falls short of full
implementation of the ICC Statute cooperation regime, but, it must be ob-
served, goes much further than that of most other Asian ICC State Parties.
Given the low number of draft or enacted pieces of cooperation legislation
across Asia, it is hoped that the Japanese and Korean examples could serve as
inspiration for other ICC State Parties in Asia in the course of their respective
drafting processes and thereby contribute to improving the situation in the re-
gion as a whole.
56. Although the absence of legislation implementing Rome Statute coop-
eration procedures is not unique to Asia,191 its scarcity its particularly manifest
in this region, with only two of Asia’s 13 State Parties to the ICC Statute giv-
ing effect to their clear obligation to cooperate. The capacity of the ICC to
function effectively is wholly dependent on cooperation because the Court
does not have an enforcement mechanism. The absence of cooperation legisla-
tion in a particular State hampers the ability of its national authorities to coop-
erate with the ICC, which, in turn, has a direct impact on the capacity of the
ICC to enforce its decisions. Asian State Parties to the Rome Statute should
therefore consider implementing Part IX thereof at their earliest convenience
in order that the Court’s ofﬁcials might have the legal authority to operate ef-
fectively in the region, if and when such a need arises in future proceedings.
189 Japan Act on Cooperation with the ICC, above n.174, art. 5.
190 LEE Keun-Gwan, above n.10, 76.
191 On the absence of legislation implementing ICC cooperation procedures in African
State Parties to the Rome Statute, see Olympia Bekou and Sangeeta Shah, Realising
the Potential of the International Criminal Court: The African Experience, 6
HRLR (2006), 499, 500.
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IV. Concluding Remarks—The Way Ahead for Asia
57. Without enacting national implementing legislation, Asian State Parties
to the Rome Statute have limited ability to investigate and prosecute core in-
ternational crimes and to cooperate with the Court. At the same time, where a
State’s domestic criminal law fails to criminalize the full range of conduct pro-
scribed under the ICC Statute, the Court might ﬁnd the State in question
“unable” to conduct investigations and prosecutions at the national level, con-
sistent with the principle of complementarity. Further, where States do not
provide for all forms of cooperation listed in Part IX of the Rome Statute, it
restricts the capacity of ICC ofﬁcials to operate on their territory. In contrast,
where States implement the Rome Statute in a holistic manner, fully incorpo-
rating both crimes and cooperation procedures, not only can States be conﬁ-
dent in investigating and prosecuting conduct at the national level without
intervention from the ICC on the basis of complementarity, but they can also
give effect to enforcement action required by the Court on their respective ter-
ritories. This enables States to fulﬁl their unequivocal obligation to cooperate
with the Court under Part IX of the Rome Statute. This article has demon-
strated that very few Asian ICC State Parties have implemented the Rome
Statute in such a manner, though aspects thereof have been incorporated into
the respective national legal frameworks of several States that form the subject
of the present study.
58. So, what can Asian State Parties to the Rome Statute do to remedy this
situation? If they have the requisite political will and legislative capacity, which
are not always assured, there are a number of tools available designed to help
States in the process of drafting legislation pertaining to their duties under the
Rome Statute. These include two databases: the National Implementing
Legislation Database (NILD)192 and the Cooperation and Judicial Assistance
Database (CJAD).193 NILD forms one component of the ICC Legal Tools
Database (LTD), whose express objective “is to include . . . every legal docu-
ment—international or national—that a practitioner working on core inter-
national crimes cases might need.”194 Divided into several thematic
192 ICC, National Implementing Legislation Database (www.legal-tools.org/en/go-to-
database/national-implementing-legislation-database/).
193 University of Nottingham Human Rights Law Centre, Cooperation and Judicial
Assistance Database (https://cjad.nottingham.ac.uk/en/).
194 Legal Tools Database, Status of work on the Tools (www.legal-tools.org/en/status-
of-work-on-the-tools/>).
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collections and hosted on the Court’s ofﬁcial website, the LTD comprises
more than 140,000 such documents at the time of writing.195 As for the
methodology behind NILD, Olympia Bekou writes as follows:
The National Implementing Legislation Database (NILD) contains a
comprehensive catalogue of all ofﬁcial versions of national ICC imple-
menting legislation, broken down to ﬁne-grain decompositions
(“spans”), which have been “tagged” with corresponding keywords se-
lected from a list of approximately 800 purposely designed keywords. It
also contains a list of key State attributes, which impart a broader picture
of particular State choices. Finally, NILD includes legal analysis of those
provisions that are of particular interest either because they are wider or
narrower than the relevant ICC Statute provision, or because they intro-
duce new concepts or notable aberrations.196
59. Like NILD, CJAD is a database of national legislation implementing the
Rome Statute, but with a focus on legislation enacted to enable the relevant
State to cooperate with the ICC.197 CJAD was established in response to a re-
quest by The Hague Working Group of the Bureau of the Assembly of States
Parties.198 As with NILD, legislation included in CJAD is broken down and
labelled with approximately 250 keywords, thereby rendering it searchable.199
In view of the fact that many State Parties to the Rome Statute outside of Asia
possess national implementing legislation, these databases could constitute
valuable tools to Asian ICC State Parties with a desire to implement, or in the
process of implementing, the Rome Statute.
195 Ibid.
196 Olympia Bekou, Building Databases for the ICC Legal Tools Project: Data
Structures and the National Implementing Legislation Database, in: Morten
Bergsmo (ed.), Active Complementarity: Legal Information Transfer (2011), 153,
156.
197 See Olympia Bekou, William E.M. Lowe and Daley J. Birkett, Fostering
Cooperation through Technology-Driven Tools, in: Olympia Bekou and Daley J.
Birkett (eds.), Cooperation and the International Criminal Court: Perspectives from
Theory and Practice (2016), 396, 399.
198 See ASP, Report of the Bureau on cooperation, ICC-ASP/11/28 (2012), para.10.
See also Olympia Bekou, William E.M. Lowe and Daley J. Birkett, above n.197,
403.
199 See Olympia Bekou, William E.M. Lowe and Daley J. Birkett, above n.197, 410.
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60. Although Asian States are underrepresented in terms of the Court’s
membership, a lack of ratiﬁcations of the ICC Statute need not be accompa-
nied by a failure on the part of Asian ICC State Parties to implement the ICC
Statute in their national legal orders. In the view of former ICC President,
Judge SONG Sang-Hyun, “[t]here is no reason for Asian states to shy away
from the ICC: the Rome Statute’s potential for strengthening the rule of law
and contributing to the prevention of atrocities is just as signiﬁcant here as
elsewhere on the globe.”200 To enact implementing legislation, governing
crimes and cooperation procedures, would constitute an important step to-
wards realizing this potential in Asia.
200 SONG Sang-Hyun, Preventive Potential of the International Criminal Court, 3
Asian JIL (2013), 203, 212.
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